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The Limits of Taiwan’s Lessons From Ukraine
The White House, Andrea Hanks
US in Asia

The Limits of Taiwan’s Lessons From Ukraine

As the Trump administration pursues a peace deal in Ukraine, European partners are speaking out. Who would rally support on behalf of Taiwan?

By Shihoko Goto

Are there lessons for Taiwan as war in Ukraine continues despite concerted efforts to restore peace? The unshakeable concern for Taiwan took yet another turn in August following the latest summit meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House. With the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Finland as well as the heads of the European Union and NATO all joining the Ukrainian president in Washington on short notice, the burning question for Taipei is: who will show up for Taiwan in its hour of need?

Taiwan’s confidence in U.S. support has taken a hit in recent weeks, not least as Washington has imposed reciprocal tariffs on Taiwanese goods to the tune of 20 percent. That’s 5 percentage points higher than the rate imposed on Japan, South Korea, and the European Union, and double the rate imposed on Britain. It’s a major blow to Taiwan’s export-focused economy at a time when retaining its competitive edge is critical in managing relations with China.

Meanwhile, President Lai Ching-te’s decision to cancel a trip to Latin America, reportedly due to U.S. concern over a transit visit, was another blow for bilateral relations. While no official plan for the Taiwanese leader to stop over in New York and Dallas this summer was ever released, speculation abounds that Washington had asked for the trip to be canceled amid concerns about its own relations with China.

The development has done little to reassure Taipei at a time when the United States is reshaping its relations with both Russia and China. Like Russia, China has never wavered from its territorial claims over its smaller neighbor. But while Moscow and Beijing have held firm to their positions, Washington’s relationships with both of these authoritarian governments are now in flux.

For Taiwan, that means bolstering support from its allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific is gaining greater urgency. But while Keir Starmer, Friedrich Merz, Giorgia Meloni, and Alexander Stubb made clear that Ukraine’s war directly impacts Britain, Germany, Italy, and Finland, the possibility of having Asian leaders demonstrating such a clear united front in support of Taiwan seems unlikely.

For one, there is no one in Asia quite like Finnish President Stubb, who has been able to bond with Trump through their shared passion for golf and has emerged as a sounding board on Europe’s position on developments in Ukraine. Italy too has been able to connect with the White House through a strong rapport between Prime Minister Meloni and the U.S. president.

To date, no leader in the Indo-Pacific has been able to develop such a personal connection with Trump. What’s more, despite having solid relations during the first Trump administration, Japan’s shaky political situation at home puts Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru in a weak position. It was late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo who made it clear (albeit after leaving office) that a Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan, which remains Tokyo’s position to date. Yet as Ishiba’s leadership faces domestic challenges, his political capital is waning and he is unlikely to be able to either gain the ear of the U.S. president or rally for regional cooperation to come to the defense of Taiwan.

Ishiba had put forward the concept of an Asian NATO when he was running for the leadership of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) a year ago. Tellingly, that proposal fell flat within Japan, and sparked concern across the region about what exactly such a concept might entail. The prospect of collective security across the region remains weak, and there is no possibility of an equivalent of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte supporting a military coalition on Taiwan’s behalf. Similarly, there is no united political body in the region and no equivalent of Ursula von der Leyen in the Indo-Pacific.

But that doesn’t mean Taiwan is completely bereft of support. While most Asian nations are now focused more on trade tensions and tariffs in their relations with the United States, there is growing interest in coming to the support of Taiwan beyond rhetoric. South Korea has repeatedly highlighted the correlation between stability in cross-strait relations and its own security, even as it remains primarily focused on managing relations with North Korea. Meanwhile Australia has remained a staunch supporter of the status quo. The Philippines too has stepped up visible support for Taiwan in the form of economic ties as well as security cooperation, especially in planning for the evacuation of its own nationals in the event of a contingency.

How governments across the Indo-Pacific can demonstrate their support for Taiwan on the one hand and ensure continued U.S. commitment to cross-strait stability on the other has been a challenge for Taipei. The latest summit meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump together with European leaders demonstrated just how critical Ukraine is to the future of Europe. The stability of Taiwan and the status quo in cross-strait relations is equally critical for the future of the Indo-Pacific. Planning for concerted political support for Taiwan must be an integral part of not only coming to the defense of Taiwan but also deterring any threats in the Taiwan Strait moving forward.

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The Authors

Shihoko Goto is a senior fellow for Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Mansfield Foundation based in Washington, D.C. and a leading expert on Indo-Pacific economic and geopolitical affairs.

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