How Has the SCO Impacted the India-Pakistan Relationship?

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) marked a key shift in 2017 by inducting India and Pakistan as full members. Founded in 2001, the organization has increasingly emerged as a forum at the forefront of discussions involving Eurasian security, economic, and political cooperation.

Pakistan’s membership in the SCO was advocated for by China, while India gained Russia’s support to join the organization, in which Beijing and Moscow are viewed as leading members. The expansion was seemingly envisioned as a way to open doors for dialogue between the two South Asian neighbors, whose relations have been strained by decades of conflict over many issues.

It’s been eight years since Pakistan and India became full members of the SCO. However, the forum has offered only sporadic opportunities for engagement and its influence on bilateral ties between India and Pakistan has remained limited. The SCO has served as a diplomatic lifeline but not a transformative force in India-Pakistan relations.

Early optimism after Pakistan and India joined the organization suggested that the SCO could become an agent that might foster stability in bilateral ties. For example, at the 2018 Qingdao Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then-Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan held informal discussions. This was a rare occurrence, as it came amid stalled bilateral talks and a lack of direct communications. Similarly, the 2019 Bishkek Summit witnessed side meetings between the two countries’ officials.

These meetings were supplemented by India and Pakistan participating in joint counterterrorism drills under the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). The RATS counterterrorism exercise in 2019 marked a significant instance of cooperation between India and Pakistan within the SCO framework.

However, a crisis in 2019 exposed the limitations of the SCO vis-à-vis India-Pakistan bilateral issues.

The 2019 attack on an Indian security convoy in Pulwama District of Indian-administered Kashmir triggered Indian airstrikes on Balakot in Pakistan. Pakistan responded with its own counterstrikes amid fears of broader escalation. During the crisis, the SCO was unable to actively mediate between the two countries. Its role was limited to merely urging India and Pakistan in a statement to resolve their differences amicably.

Later that same year, India revoked the autonomy of Indian-administered Kashmir, which further inflamed ties between Pakistan and India; Islamabad halted trade and downgraded relations with New Delhi. During that episode, the SCO issued no unified response or official statement as the forum was hampered by its consensus-driven model and lack of formal dispute-resolution tools.

During India’s presidency of the SCO in 2022-2023, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said that Kashmir’s special status was “history” and refused to discuss the issue of terrorism with Pakistan within the confines of the organization. Pakistan’s then-Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari urged India to avoid using “terrorism” as a diplomatic instrument. “Terrorism continues to threaten global security,” Zardari said in his address at a gathering of SCO foreign minister in Goa in May 2023. “Let’s not get caught up in weaponizing terrorism for diplomatic point scoring.”

India held the leaders’ level summit virtually that year.

In 2024, Pakistan became the SCO chair. The 2024 Islamabad Summit offered a glimmer of hope as Jaishankar visited the country. It was the first senior-level trip from any Indian official to Pakistan in years. The visit resulted in cordial exchanges with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. But conversation was mainly confined to multilateral issues.

From Pakistan’s standpoint, hosting the SCO in 2024 demonstrated its commitment to regional harmony and potentially eased economic isolation through renewed ties with India. However, once again, there was no progress on India-Pakistan bilateral issues at the forum, as New Delhi remained stuck to terrorism-related discourse while Pakistan tried to counter India’s claims by highlighting the issue of Kashmir as central to South Asian stability.

Again, there was no effort from the SCO to bridge the gap between the two countries’ positions. This left both India and Pakistan advocating their views through statements at the forum, rather than engaging in meaningful talks with the goal of dispute resolution.

India-Pakistan tensions boiled over in 2025. The attack on civilians in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, prompted a four-day war between the two countries in May. Despite heightened military tensions, the SCO didn’t call an emergency meeting or play a visible role in facilitating de-escalation. India-Pakistan trade remains suspended to date, and airspace closures have disrupted regional corridors.

India-Pakistan differences have blocked consensus from emerging at various SCO meetings. At the SCO’s defense ministers’ meeting in Qingdao in June, India refused to sign a joint statement that it perceived as representing Pakistan’s position on the issue of terrorism and Kashmir. Additionally, Pakistan and China pushed for balanced language on security at the Qingdao meeting, but India’s opposition stalled consensus. Thus, the SCO avoided condemning the May clashes between the two countries, which highlighted the deep divisions at the forum.

The eight-year journey of India and Pakistan within the SCO shows that the forum has mattered little in bringing the two countries together.

At best, the SCO has sustained channels that bilateral mechanisms have not been able to keep open. For example, backchannel efforts, possibly involving SCO observers like Saudi Arabia and core member China, aided de-escalation between India and Pakistan during the war in May. But it was mainly at the level of individual states rather than an effort from within the SCO. Meanwhile, the RATS counterterrorism exercises under the SCO platform have built only limited security trust between the two countries.

The SCO holds few economic incentives that could encourage stability in ties between India and Pakistan. So far, the forum remains unable to bridge core divides, including on Kashmir, terrorism accusations, and water issues, including the Indus Waters Treaty.

To truly impact relations, both India and Pakistan must utilize the SCO for comprehensive discussions on all issues, including borders, terrorism, and water sharing. If both countries are willing, the forum can provide an ideal neutral space, which is backed by influential members like China and Russia, to rebuild confidence.

Bilateral engagements, such as the stalled composite dialogue, have faltered due to recurring crises. India’s longstanding policy against third-party mediation may need reevaluation. The policy has not yielded results with respect to dispute resolution with Pakistan. The idea of New Delhi embracing SCO-facilitated assurances could offer verifiable commitments to both countries. Arguably, Pakistan seeks guarantees on equitable water distribution and the issue of Kashmir, while India demands verifiable counterterror actions.

Multilateral oversight under the aegis of the SCO might mitigate distrust and foster transparency and accountability, which have not been achieved via direct talks. However, for that to happen, both India and Pakistan will have to accept a mediatory role for the SCO in their bilateral disputes. And the SCO’s members would have to want to take on that role. Until then, it will be impossible for SCO to move beyond encouraging both countries to resolve their disputes amicably.