Letter from the Editors
Policy prescriptions rarely achieve their lofty goals – or the goalposts shift over time.
Governments are in the business of planning and policymaking, and we in the media make note of each major announcement. Intention and ambition are important, of course, but the follow-through is even more critical, and it’s here that things really get interesting. Whether it’s grand plans for an alliance to “counter China” or a government’s blueprint for economic success and innovation, policy prescriptions rarely achieve their lofty goals – or the goalposts shift over time.
Our cover story explores the curious case of the Quad – one of the few multilateral groupings that hasn’t come under attack by the Trump administration since it took office in January. Aparna Pande, a research fellow at Hudson Institute, traces the Quad from its resurrection during Trump’s first term to its expansion under the Biden administration and its continued relevance under Trump 2.0. Yet there’s a central contradiction at play: the Quad has made the least progress in the hard security areas arguably of most interest to Washington. Meanwhile, Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy “seeks to rebuild the U.S. civilian and military industrial base and pull back from most global commitments,” Pande points out. “The Indo-Pacific strategy, and the Quad minilateral, align with the former objective, but run counter to the latter.”
Back in 2015,, Beijing introduced a new policy – dubbed “Made in China 2025” – that aimed to see Chinese industry gain market share in critical technologies and generally move up the industrial value chain. As the policy wraps up this year, Andreas Mischer, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin, evaluates how China fared in achieving its goals. However, as Mischer notes, perhaps more interesting than what boxes were checked is the more fundamental question of how “Made in China 2025” itself changed. “The original policy and roadmap prioritized targets for market share and patent applications and the development of quality Chinese brands,” Mischer writes. Today, China is pursuing similar policies, but with different goals: “achieving technological self-reliance and bringing industrial supply chains within China’s borders.”
Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariff announcement sent shockwaves around the world, but arguably no country has more at stake than Vietnam. Nguyen Khac Giang, a visiting fellow at the Vietnam Studies Program, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, argues that the tariffs – and, even more concerningly, the U.S. obsession with transshipments from China – strike at the heart of Vietnam’s economic model. “For years, Vietnam had perfected the art of being indispensable to both the United States and China,” Giang notes. But now its intermediary role is a source of pressure, not resilience. Can Vietnam remake its economy, all while escaping the dreaded middle-income trap?
We hope you enjoy these stories, and the many more in the following pages.