How Will Lee Jae-myung Approach the United States?

Two days after his victory in the June 3 presidential election, and one after assuming office, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung spoke with U.S. President Donald Trump. According to a spokesperson for the South Korean Presidential Office, the two leaders discussed a range of topics concerned with the interests of both countries.

Trump initiated a “tariff war” against nearly the entire world – including U.S. allies – in April, at a time when South Korea’s democratic and political systems were in chaos due to Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law. With a July deadline looming to head off the worst tariff rates, trade negotiations with the Trump administration became the top priority for Lee as soon as he assumed the presidency.

Under the so-called “ironclad” South Korea-U.S. alliance, leaders in Seoul typically deem relations with the United States to be the backbone of South Korea’s foreign policy. In this context, under both conservative and liberal presidents, Seoul has consistently acted in concert with Washington on the international stage.

Still, observers were concerned that Lee might stand against the United States, as he had criticized Yoon for being overly antagonistic toward China. To address those critiques, during the presidential campaign Lee repeatedly emphasized that he will work toward strengthening South Korea-U.S. relations. Despite some worries in Washington that Lee could be a pro-China president, he reiterated that he will handle every task while prioritizing the alliance and relations with the United States.

However, Lee’s pragmatic leadership centers on boosting the national interests of South Korea, including its economy, diplomacy, and defense. This in turn implies that he will not avoid tensions with Washington when necessary to defend South Korea’s interests. In other words, Lee would not hesitate to raise his voice against Trump if he is pushed to sign a deal that is not beneficial for South Korea. 

There are several different areas of the relationship that could cause tensions if Lee and Trump fail to reach a common understanding.

Tariffs

On April 2, Trump announced a list of reciprocal tariffs he was planning to impose on U.S. trading partners around the world, including China, India, South Korea, the European Union, Japan, and many more. Since then, some countries have reached a deal with the Trump administration to secure lower tariff rates (but not avoid tariffs entirely). But South Korea, one of the key U.S. allies in Asia, was still negotiating with Washington until the last minute.

Since announcing the tariffs in April, the Trump administration has pushed back the date for imposing the duties several times. According to the latest announcement, the U.S. was set to impose 25 percent tariffs on all imports from South Korea starting August 1, unless the two sides reached a deal. 

To prevent the country’s economy from being harmed by Trump’s tariff war, Lee’s national security adviser and trade minister were supposed to meet their counterparts in Washington from July 23-25. However, the trade meetings were postponed, with the U.S. citing a scheduling conflict. That set off alarm bells in South Korea.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun travelled to the U.S. on July 30, a last-ditch effort to stave off the tariffs set to take effect two days later. A deal was announced on July 31, just in the nick of time.

After weeks of uncertainty, Seoul succeeded in reaching a deal that will see the Trump administration lower tariffs from 25 percent to 15 percent (the same rate Japan secured after its negotiations). Like Japan, South Korea offered to buy $100 billion worth of U.S. energy exports, especially LNG, and invest some $350 billion in the United States – including $150 billion specifically to help renew the U.S. shipbuilding industry.

Like Japan, South Korea also secured the 15 percent tariff rate for its automotive exports to the U.S., which had faced sector-specific tariffs of 25 percent. However, Seoul was unable to secure an exception for its steel and aluminum industry. All U.S. imports of those materials have been hit with 50 percent tariffs. 

It appears that the Lee administration was able to use its leverage in the shipbuilding and LNG industries to secure a deal. Notably, the Lee administration negotiated a lower tariff rate without further opening its agriculture sector to U.S. imports in exchange. Analysts had predicted South Korea might face pressure to open its rice and beef markets and permit imports of genetically modified agricultural products.

South Korea’s food and agricultural industries strongly oppose lifting any of the restrictions that have been imposed on U.S. agriculture imports. And Lee has pledged to boost the so-called “K-agriculture” industry, vowing to enhance the competitiveness of the country’s agriculture industry and protect farmers amid the climate crisis. The Lee administration can breath more easily now that it has secured a deal without having to give ground on these sensitive areas.

As with all the trade deals announced this month, however, the details have yet to be ironed out.

North Korea

North Korea is another perennial point of concern for the South Korea-U.S. alliance. That’s even more true now, as North Korea-Russia military cooperation has strengthened significantly since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. In return for supplying ammunition and deploying soldiers to Russia, North Korea is believed to have received economic assistance from Russia, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has signaled that he may provide technological assistance for Pyongyang to build satellites or advance its missile or submarine programs.

To cope with the North’s growing nuclear capabilities, Trump may seek to engage in dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un again. The U.S. president has expressed interest in negotiating with Kim, and this is an area where Lee and Trump may find common ground.

However, many observers and experts have expressed pessimism on the possibility of restarting either the deadlocked nuclear talks between the U.S. and North Korea or inter-Korean dialogue. Kim was deeply embarrassed by Trump’s decision to walk out of the summit meeting in Hanoi in 2019. With North Korea now firmly backed by Russia, there is no urgent reason for Kim to appear at the negotiating table. Pyongyang has apparently ghosted Washington’s outreach since Trump assumed office.

On July 28, Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and the regime’s main voice on inter-Korean relations, said Pyongyang had “no interest” in South Korea’s positive signals.

“No matter how desperately the Lee Jae Myung government tries… there can be no change in our state’s understanding of the enemy,” Kim said. She added that Lee’s administration “can not turn back the hands of the clock of the history which has radically changed the character of the DPRK-ROK relations.”

The crucial point is that the North now has deep mistrust toward both Trump and Seoul. North Korea does not see Trump as a reliable counterpart. After Trump’s decision to walk out of the summit meeting in Hanoi, Kim had to sit with his humiliation on the long journey back home – which took more than 60 hours.

As for Seoul, North Korea does not see any place for its neighbor in the nuclear talks at all. Simply speaking, Pyongyang believes that Seoul has no power as it does not have any nuclear weapons. As Kim Yo Jong put it in her statement, “there is neither the reason to meet nor the issue to be discussed” with Seoul.

Unfortunately, Washington and Seoul also have deep mistrust toward Pyongyang. Since 1994, there have been several agreements made between the U.S. and North Korea, but Pyongyang’s consistent attempts to build up nuclear weapons – particularly a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile – ultimately led Washington to believe that the North Korean government has no interest in “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” In this context, even at the height of Kim-Trump negotiations in 2018 and 2019, many observers in Washington took a pessimistic view, saying that Kim will never give up his nuclear weapons.

This sentiment is also prevalent in Seoul, as the North unilaterally blew up the joint liaison office with South Korea following the breakdown of the summit meeting between Trump and Kim. No matter what agreement might be made with Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul fundamentally believe that the Kim regime would never abandon its nuclear weapons. This is the main reason why Washington and Seoul have sought to recalibrate their approaches on Pyongyang to deter its aggression to develop more advanced nuclear weapons.

Despite the failure of the Hanoi summit, the Lee administration still recognizes that Trump was the only sitting U.S. president willing to directly negotiate with Kim to resolve the security challenges on the Korean Peninsula. His approach was at least effective in bringing the leader of one of the most autocratic countries in the world to the negotiating table to discuss dismantling his nuclear arsenal. Previous U.S. presidents wanted to show that they were not desperate to deal with North Korea’s nuclear threats under the so-called “strategic patience” approach. By contrast, Trump’s business-style diplomacy worked in the initial stage when negotiating with Kim – despite his failed attempt to make Kim accept his “all for all” deal for denuclearization at the Hanoi summit.

North Korea is the one of the areas where Trump and Lee can work together, but the prospects seem dim. Given the international security challenges in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. is not putting a priority on restoring nuclear talks with North Korea. Inter-Korean dialogue faces steep hurdles due to Yoon’s attempts to justify his martial law by provoking North Korea – including by sending drones near Kim’s residence last year. Given these constraints, South Korea and the U.S. would need neighboring countries, especially China, to get involved to restart dialogue with North Korea, but there seems to be little interest from Beijing at this point.

South Korea’s Self-Defense Capabilities and OPCON Transfer

The South Korea-U.S. alliance itself is under pressure as Trump seeks to shift more of the burden onto U.S. allies. The U.S. has demanded South Korea to raise its defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. Currently, South Korea spends 2.6 percent of its GDP (roughly $47 million) on defense.

Lee will faces pressure from Washington to change the core mission of the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea from monitoring North Korea to addressing the security challenges caused by China. The Trump administration has explicitly voiced its desire to shift the main role of U.S. Forces Korea from a focus on the Korean Peninsula to a broader role in coping with the growing power of China in the East Asia region, especially its aggression toward Taiwan.

The Lee administration is also trying to achieve OPCON transfer – meaning the shift of wartime operational control over Korean forces from the U.S. to South Korea. It is natural for a sovereign state to have its own wartime operational control, and for many liberal administrations OPCON transfer has served as a symbol of sovereignty and independence. However, there are many voices in the South that advocate for letting the U.S. keep wartime operational control in order to effectively cope with the North’s aggression. Indeed, North Korea’s direct military provocations against the South in 2010 – the sinking of the Cheonan naval vessel and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island – indefinitely postponed the schedule for OPCON transfer.

Lee has clearly stated that nuclear development is not a realistic option for South Korea to confront North Korea’s growing nuclear threats. However, Lee may demand that Washington provide some sensitive missile technologies so that South Korea can build up its conventional arsenal as a means to strengthen its self-defense capabilities.

The South will gradually increase its defense spending going forward, although 5 percent of GDP will be a high bar to clear. The more important factor will be how Seoul can promote the domestic defense industry while building up a concrete intelligence system.