Ahmede Hussain

On August 5, 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to flee Bangladesh, taking refuge across the border in India. She was driven not only out of power but out of the country by a wave of public anger – ostensibly caused by the resurrection of a controversial quota system for government jobs, but more accurately the culmination of a decade-and-a-half of mounting repression, extrajudicial violence, and corruption.

Days after Hasina’s ouster, Bangladesh had a new government, headed by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus. That remains the situation today. What has changed in the year since then, and where is Bangladesh headed next?

Ahmede Hussain, a Bangladeshi writer and journalist, looks back on the past year, from the origins of the July 2024 revolution to the country’s current status. He notes that Bangladesh is at an inflection point: “If free and fair elections take place – where every citizen can vote – it could mark a new beginning for a country that’s becoming an increasingly important player in the Indo-Pacific.”

The first step? “Making sure no one is ever allowed to become another Hasina.”

Let’s start a year ago: What was the initial cause of the protests in July 2024 that culminated in the fall of the Sheikh Hasina/Awami League government? Beyond the proximate cause, what was at the core of popular anger at the government?

The events of July 2024 might have surprised many, but in truth, discontent had been simmering in Bangladesh for quite some time. The immediate trigger was the reinstatement of a controversial quota system in civil service exams, which allocated a disproportionate number of government jobs to the descendants of those who fought in the Liberation War. This issue had been resolved back in 2018, following widespread protests, when the government agreed to scrap the provision.

But things took a turn after Sheikh Hasina returned to power in a widely disputed election early last year – an election so discredited that even many within her own party didn’t turn out to vote. Voter turnout was abnormally low. With the opposition in disarray, she seemed emboldened and began entertaining the idea of reintroducing the quota system.

Government jobs remain highly sought-after among fresh graduates, and the quota touched a nerve. Despite the narrative of economic progress often promoted in the media, Bangladesh under Hasina’s rule remained deeply corrupt. A small group of politically connected business elites were allowed to plunder the economy, while ordinary citizens faced growing repression – enforced disappearances, severe limits on free speech, and an increasingly authoritarian climate where people could be picked up for something as minor as sharing a meme deemed disrespectful to Hasina, her father, or her allies.

By mid-July, it all boiled over. Years of frustration finally erupted, and given the government’s long-standing disregard for dissent, the scale of the backlash shouldn’t have come as a surprise. Frankly, Hasina and her party, the Awami League, had it coming.

After the government fell, Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus stepped in to head an interim government. What have Yunus’ priorities been? How have these been received by the Bangladeshi public and key political constituencies?

Right after Muhammad Yunus took over – following the mass uprising that forced South Asia’s longest-serving dictator to flee to India – the interim government, as it’s now being called, was handed the tough job of trying to fix a country where most major institutions had already fallen apart. The civil administration was full of Hasina’s loyalists, the police had no idea how to handle unrest without using lethal force, there was barely an electoral system in place, and civil-military relations had completely broken down. On top of that, there’s this strong hunger for change among the youth – most of whom have never even had a chance to vote, let alone speak freely.

Honestly, one big reason Hasina managed to stay in power for so long was because the opposition parties just couldn’t connect with young people. Bangladesh’s median age is 27, yet the leadership of both the center-right BNP and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami is still dominated by older figures. That’s also part of why some of these figures are in no rush for reform – they just want Yunus to hold elections as soon as possible, no matter what shape the system is in.

You can really see this generational divide play out on social media. Gen Z – who were at the forefront of the July movement – are constantly trolling the political elite with memes, reels, and sarcastic TikTok videos.

As for Yunus, he has been and still is hugely popular right now. He’s the country’s only Nobel Peace Prize winner and is widely seen as a symbol of national pride. But whether he’ll be able to carry that support forward and actually push through the deep reforms Bangladesh needs – that’s something only time will tell.

The Yunus government came to power with an ambitious agenda to remake the foundations of Bangladesh's governance. How has it fared at the more mundane aspects of governing –  for instance, securing law and order and keeping the economy afloat?

To be honest, right after Hasina’s fall, people in different parts of the cities spontaneously formed neighborhood watch groups to protect their property and make sure nothing went wrong. It’s important to remember that Bangladesh’s Monsoon Revolution was largely peaceful and organic. Even at the height of the protests, no shops were looted, public property was mostly respected, and not a single vehicle was vandalized.

But things began to shift by mid-December. The law and order situation started to deteriorate when thugs affiliated with the BNP – now the country’s largest political party – began to fill the power vacuum left by the Awami League’s collapse. Internal clashes within the BNP have triggered a series of murders, and some fringe extremist religious elements have tried to exploit the instability, even going so far as to harass women in the capital for “not dressing modestly.”

To its credit, the Yunus government did respond and has taken steps to bring some of the perpetrators to justice. But overall, the response has been slow. As I mentioned earlier, the police simply don’t have the training or capacity to manage unrest without resorting to heavy-handed tactics. On top of that, parts of the bureaucracy and police seem to be hedging their bets – some believe the BNP will win the next election, and they’re reluctant to crack down on the party’s members for fear it might hurt their own careers.

So yes, law and order – and especially the protection of minority rights – remain serious challenges. Yunus absolutely has to take a firm stance on both fronts.

On the economic side, things are actually holding up better than expected. Many feared a complete collapse after Hasina’s regime fell, but the reality has been more stable. The ongoing tariff negotiations with the Trump administration will certainly impact exports to the U.S. but Bangladesh still benefits from millions of expatriate workers who send remittances home regularly. In fact, the country’s foreign reserves have seen a boost in U.S. dollars in recent months.

What challenges have the interim government faced in pursuing the reforms it aimed to usher through?

Interestingly – and perhaps a bit ironically – the most significant challenge facing the country right now isn’t from the street or the public, but from the ruling elites themselves, particularly some of the major political parties. While one might assume that, after the fall of a long-standing autocratic regime, the political class would come together in support of national reform, that hasn’t been the case. In fact, some senior figures within these parties have openly argued that holding elections should be the immediate priority, and that structural reforms can wait.

But this view seems completely out of step with the mood of the nation. If anything, the recent Monsoon Revolution marked a clear turning point in Bangladesh’s political history. For the first time in decades, ordinary people – especially the youth – mobilized not just for a change in leadership, but for a deeper, more systemic overhaul of how the country is governed. Their message was simple: cosmetic change is not enough.

Pushing for a rushed election without first laying the groundwork for institutional reform risks repeating the same cycle of dysfunction and corruption that led to this crisis in the first place. Bangladeshis have made it clear that they want a break from the past – new rules, new safeguards, and new leadership that actually reflects the will and aspirations of its people.

So while the calls for elections are growing louder in certain political circles, the real priority, according to public sentiment, remains reform – deep, credible, and long overdue.

In June, after months of delay, Yunus announced that elections will be scheduled for early April 2026. A month earlier, the Awami League’s registration was suspended, effectively barring the party from participating in any upcoming elections. At this juncture, what are the key players vying to take power in Bangladesh?

Right now, the BNP stands as the largest political force in the country. The other major players are Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the National Citizen Party (NCP), and Islamic Movement Bangladesh (IAB). The left, for the most part, has been absent from the scene.

The BNP, a centrist party, has long been a victim of state oppression – its members were relentlessly targeted by Hasina’s security forces. But since her fall, that situation has started to shift. Some BNP members have been implicated in serious crimes, including murder, rape, extortion, racketeering, and land grabbing. These actions haven’t gone unnoticed – especially among young voters, who played a key role in the recent uprising.

Jamaat-e-Islami has a reputation for being disciplined and, in some quarters, even honest. However, the party's controversial past still haunts it – some of its senior leaders collaborated with the Pakistan Army during the Liberation War. While the party is trying to rebrand itself, its current leadership lacks the maturity and credibility of its pre-2014 predecessors, often resorting to funny attention-seeking tactics.

The NCP is a newcomer, born out of the Gen Z-led revolution. It seems to enjoy growing urban youth support, but its leadership is inexperienced and, at times, disorganized. Whether that support translates into votes remains to be seen. The IAB, led by a religious cleric, retains pockets of influence across the country but is not a big force nationally.

Elections in Bangladesh have traditionally been about grand alliances – two major blocs squaring off. It's still too early to say how those alliances will form.

The Awami League is officially barred from contesting, but many of its leaders – especially those with business ties – have been left untouched by the Yunus administration and could run as independents.

Since gaining independence, Bangladesh has cycled through successive governments, some elected some not, with crackdowns on dissent and the use of political violence near-constants. Do you think the 2024 uprising will mark a decisive turning point in Bangladesh's political history, or just another stage in the cycle?

Ultimately, the future depends on the people – and the kind of relationship they build with the political leadership. Unlike the bleak days of military dictatorship, ordinary Bangladeshis today – especially the youth – are far more politically aware. Social media played a major role during the Monsoon Revolution, and it will no doubt shape the next election as well.

What was particularly striking in July 2024 was the stance taken by ordinary members of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. Officers below the rank of brigadier general, at a certain point, reportedly refused to fire on civilians. Bangladesh, unlike some of its South Asian counterparts, is a relatively cohesive nation-state. People are united by language, shared ancestry, a mostly common religion – and even the same Sunni school of Islam. Since the 1990s, any attempt to pit the military against the public has largely failed. A defining moment was in 1990, when the army chief refused to carry out dictator H.M. Ershad’s orders to deploy troops against protesters.

That said, the military’s top brass – largely due to its close alignment with Hasina – faces significant public distrust. This isn’t Pakistan, where army chiefs are celebrated and their photos plastered on public buses. In Bangladesh, some military figures are widely criticized for their role in corruption, enforced disappearances, and other activities far removed from national defense. Even if an ambitious general were tempted to take over, it’s hard to imagine it ending well. The memory of July is still raw, and the recent crash of an Air Force trainee plane into a school full of children has reignited scrutiny of corruption in defense procurement.

Bangladesh is clearly at a crossroads. If Muhammad Yunus is given the space to carry out reforms, and if free and fair elections take place – where every citizen can vote – it could mark a new beginning for a country that’s becoming an increasingly important player in the Indo-Pacific. We also can't forget that Bangladesh lies between two Asian giants, India and China, and borders three nuclear-armed nations. The country’s future is tied to regional stability – and that can only come through strong, democratic institutions.

And the first step? Making sure no one is ever allowed to become another Hasina.