Strategic Convergence Between India and the European Union

At this year’s Munich Security Conference, remarks by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance marked a turning point in the evolving geopolitical landscape. His speech confronted a stark reality: the EU-U.S. partnership – once the fulcrum of the global liberal order – has reached its limits. Pax Americana, the era of U.S. dominance and liberal internationalism, is coming to an end. In its place, a new world order is emerging – its contours still uncertain, its implications globally resonant.

In this transitional phase, this interregnum, middle powers such as the EU and India must proceed with strategic prudence. The global stage is no longer monopolized by a single hegemon; it is becoming multipolar, with power redistributed across several centers of gravity. In this context, the deepening convergence between New Delhi and Brussels is more than a diplomatic footnote – it is a sign of things to come. If they can overcome their differences, both geographies stand to benefit significantly from their growing alignment and could jointly rise to new strategic importance.

The Multipolar Moment

For decades, the United States formed the backbone of global governance – militarily, economically, and diplomatically. The liberal world order rested on the transatlantic alliance. The U.S. guaranteed Europe’s defense and upheld global institutions from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization. No longer. Vance made it unmistakably clear that the U.S. is stepping back from this role. Only weeks later, the unfurling of U.S. President Donald Trump’s protectionist trade agenda confirmed this shift.

According to Vance, the U.S. is refocusing on national sovereignty over global stewardship and expects its partners to do the same. Alarmingly, he suggested that shared values alone no longer suffice to guarantee Europe’s security. Within this broader realignment, Trump’s dramatic tariff hikes – targeting not only China but also traditional allies like the EU – represent another rupture in the crumbling global order, even if the tariffs were later scaled back somewhat. This turn toward protectionism, marketed as a realignment of global trade to support domestic industry, undermines multilateral norms and roils global markets. The turn inward is no longer a trend; it is a doctrine.

At the heart of U.S. strategic recalibration is the containment of China’s rise. To succeed, the U.S. seeks to shift the burden of the Ukraine war onto Europe, establish a stable equilibrium in the Middle East – e.g., via the Abraham Accords – and strengthen its domestic economic base. The consequences of this shift are profound. The once-uncontested U.S. hegemony is giving way to a multipolar order in which power is dispersed among several ascending powers. The U.S. remains a dominant force, but it is no longer the sole orchestrator of global affairs. For partners like India and the EU, both reliant on rules-based trade, this serves as a sobering warning: the liberal global economic system is more fragile than ever. Diversifying strategic and commercial dependencies as well as supply chains has become an urgent imperative. The new world is no longer led by a single conductor, but played by a discordant orchestra of competing powers.

Today’s multiple power centers include the U.S., China, and Russia. The EU, while a significant player, struggles to assert itself due to internal fragmentation and political paralysis. For Europe, the way forward hinges on a strategic reassessment of its alliances – especially with the U.S., China, and India. It can only assert itself as a global pole if it transforms its economic scale into strategic influence via deeper integration, investment in innovation and defense, and a coherent foreign policy that effectively leverages its power and global partnerships.

India, meanwhile, is poised to become a global shaper. With its economic dynamism and geopolitical position, it is gaining influence across Asia and beyond. Yet to become a full-fledged pole in the global order, India must further sharpen its geoeconomic strategy: enact domestic structural reforms, strengthen industrial capacity, while expanding participation in global value chains, adopting a more outward-oriented trade policy. Infrastructure constraints – in logistics, ports, and digital networks – must too be overcome. The country further must provide regulatory stability, administrative efficiency, and rule-of-law assurances to attract investment. Its strong digital public infrastructure and large internal market position it to shape global norms in technology, data governance, and digital finance.

These actors – India, the EU, the U.S., China, and Russia – possess generally the autonomy, reach, and long-term capabilities to shape the new order. Other powers, such as Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkiye, play growing regional roles and are asserting themselves on the global stage. Yet, they lack the full combination of global reach, economic size, institutional robustness, and power projection to become independent poles. Their influence, while rising, remains constrained. For the foreseeable future, they will need to balance, hedge, align, and compete with established power centers. Their growing participation in forums like BRICS+, the African Union, and the G-20 points to increasing pluralism – but not yet full polarity.

Strategic Convergence Between India and the EU

India and the EU share a commitment to strategic autonomy in an increasingly fragmented world. India’s tradition of foreign policy independence stems from its leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement and its current role in the Global South. The EU, too, is beginning to rethink its posture – spurred by weakening transatlantic ties and growing unpredictability in U.S. foreign and trade policy.

Security-wise, the EU must strengthen its role as a guarantor of its own continent. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed Europe’s vulnerabilities. Deterrence and defense can no longer rely primarily on transatlantic channels. The EU must scale up its military capacity through joint investments, closer force coordination, and credible deterrence capabilities along its eastern flank. This demands not just political will but a coherent security strategy centered on European interests. A standalone security pillar, capable of collective action and deterrence even amid U.S. volatility, is essential, though realistically, this will take at least a decade, limiting the EU’s global assertiveness in the near term.

The current geopolitical volatility underscores the need to diversify strategic partnerships. Within this context, the remnants of a rules-based order form a shared reference frame. Both the EU and India see themselves as stabilizers in a system increasingly strained by power politics. Together, they could safeguard remaining multilateral structures while simultaneously advancing cooperation in bi-, tri-, and minilateral formats. Economically, the two partners share a growing alignment of interests. Both prioritize the development of resilient supply chains, the advancement of technological innovation, and the mitigation of asymmetric dependencies – particularly in relation to China and critical technologies.

Beneath this convergence lies a deeper imperative: both India and the EU must fundamentally redefine their respective growth models. For the EU, this means moving beyond export-led growth and regulatory soft power, toward a more investment-driven, innovation-focused economic architecture that can withstand geopolitical shocks. India, meanwhile, must transition from consumption-driven growth toward a more export-competitive and industrialized economy, underpinned by structural reforms, enhanced productivity, and integration into global value chains. For both, aligning geoeconomic ambition with domestic economic transformation will be key to sustaining long-term strategic relevance. A comprehensive free trade agreement would anchor these shared goals and symbolize a deeper geoeconomic partnership.

In the Indo-Pacific, an area of strategic relevance, there is a natural division of labor: The EU, preoccupied with continental challenges, is unlikely to play a central security role. India, however, is already a key security actor there. The EU, through its Indo-Pacific strategy, seeks to expand its presence as an economic and development partner. Recognizing and working with India’s growing role in the region offers a pragmatic way to balance China’s expanding influence.

A clear signal of deepening engagement is the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which institutionalizes cooperation in areas such as AI, cybersecurity, semiconductors, and digital regulation. This reflects a joint ambition to build technological sovereignty and reduce geopolitical dependencies.

The emergence of a multipolar world opens a strategic window. India and the EU possess the economic, institutional, and geopolitical relevance to help shape this new order. Their rapprochement is not just about pragmatic interests – it is a structural contribution to global stability and reform. India continues to pursue a balanced foreign policy, maintaining strong ties with both the U.S. and Russia, while deepening its partnerships with Japan, Australia, and ASEAN.

The EU, for its part, must recalibrate its geoeconomic strategy. Reviving stalled trade agreements – especially with India and Southeast Asia – is essential. These deals are not only about market access, but about building resilient value chains and strategic autonomy. Initiatives like the Three Seas Initiative and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) should be integrated into a cohesive vision: a new axis linking Europe, the Gulf, and South Asia around key technologies, resources, and logistics networks of both civilian and strategic importance.

A long-delayed EU-India free trade agreement is now within reach, driven by a geopolitical rationale that has never been more compelling: resilience, autonomy, and stability in an increasingly fractured global landscape. The political will is clear. On February 27-28, 2025, the entire European Commission, led by President Ursula von der Leyen, traveled to New Delhi for high-level talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Von der Leyen described the relationship as a potential “defining partnership of the 21st century” and called for a partnership “without limits.”

During the visit, both sides agreed on a series of strategic priorities to elevate the relationship: concluding the free trade agreement by the end of 2025, advancing the IMEC as a key connectivity initiative, launching a bilateral security and defense dialogue, and convening the next EU–India Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting without delay. In parallel, the TTC issued a joint statement on cooperation in critical technologies, strengthening supply chain resilience, and digital regulation.

Modi identified eight priority areas, signaling India’s readiness to operationalize the strategic partnership. The growing convergence between Delhi and Brussels is unmistakable.

Seizing the Interregnum

As the world undergoes a profound transition, India and the EU must recognize each other’s strategic value. They share interests and face similar challenges. Pragmatism and geopolitical priority must outweigh technocratic and regulatory divergences. Together, India and the EU can help shape the future global order, safeguard stability, and advance their shared goals.

Europe must move beyond its traditional reliance on the U.S. and adopt a more independent and forward-looking foreign policy. The partnership with India offers a historic opportunity to secure Europe’s role as a global force for peace and prosperity in the 21st century. What began as a delayed trade negotiation may, in retrospect, come to be seen as the first step in forging a new axis of global stability – linking Brussels and New Delhi in a partnership neither sentimental nor transactional, but strategically inevitable.